讲座题目：Value Creation of Shareholder Activism: A Game Theory Perspective
主讲嘉宾： 王荔红 教授
时间：2025年12月15日10:00--12:00
地点：商学院304会议室
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智能财务与公司治理研究团队
2025年12月11日
主讲嘉宾简介
王荔红，厦门大学财务管理与会计研究院，教授，博士生导师，教工党支部书记，同时兼任厦门大学会计研究中心专职研究员，美国佛罗里达州立大学、新加坡国立大学、比利时鲁汶大学和英国卡迪夫大学访问学者。入选财政部高层次财会人才素质提升工程（中青年—学术类）、百千万工程省级人才、雏鹰计划青年拔尖人才、省高层次人才、会计人才库以及省杰出青年科研人才培育计划。研究领域为：财务管理与公司治理，在Journal of Banking and Finance、Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting、Applied Economics、Pacific-basin Finance Journal、European Journal of Finance及南开管理评论等期刊发表论文多篇。成果获国家自科和国家社科课题支持2项、省部级项目6项（其中省级重大项目3项，部级一般项目1项）、人才项目3项、国际课题1项、厅级项目1项和市重大、重点课题2项，获厦门市社会科学优秀成果奖，并在我国多家上市公司担任独立董事。。
讲座主要内容
Using a sample of non-financial listed firms in China from 2006 to 2022, this study examines non-controlling blockholders’(NCBs) activism through board appointment and how such activism creates firm value under varying strategic and institutional conditions. The findings show that NCBs’ activism significantly enhances firm value, primarily by curbing tunneling and inefficient investment. We then show that NCBs’ activism is not a unilateral initiative but rather the outcome of strategic bargaining with controlling shareholders (CSs), shaped by power asymmetries and defensive responses. Yet, under cooperative equilibria, reflected by NCBs’ relative strong power and non-defensive behavior from CSs, the value-enhancing effect of activism is further amplified. Heterogeneity analyses reveal that the value effects of NCBs’ activism are more pronounced in privately controlled firms and in settings with strong governance and institutional safeguards, while in environments characterized by concentrated control, state ownership, or weak institutional protections, value creation relies on cooperative equilibria to compensate for institutional deficiencies.
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