讲座题目：Incentivizing Corporate R&D: A Survey of the Literature and Exploration of New Frontiers
主讲嘉宾：蔡大鹏
时间：2025年5月9日（星期五）上午9:30—11:30
地点：商学院116东方厅
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江南大学商学院
2025年4月28日
主讲嘉宾简介
Dr. Dapeng Cai is a Professor of Economics at the Faculty of Economics, Nanzan University, and a Visiting Professor at the Institute for Advanced Research, Nagoya University. His research focuses on the origins of economic regulations and policies, with particular attention to state intervention in the marketplace. He emphasizes the political processes that shape policymaking and has examined topics such as the determination of tariff rates, preferential treatment of state-owned enterprises, and the implementation of pollution taxes. His work has been published in journals such as Journal of Regulatory Economics, Environmental and Resource Economics, and Japanese Economic Review.
讲座主要内容
In recent years, the significant uncertainty surrounding innovation and the rising costs of research and development (R&D) have led to a notable increase in collaborative R&D efforts among firms (Sovinsky 2022). This trend has been further reinforced by a global resurgence of industrial policies, with governments becoming increasingly supportive of joint R&D initiatives and willing to subsidize their costs. Notable examples include the U.S. CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 and Japan’s $1.8 billion in subsidies for battery and semiconductor projects in 2023. Against this backdrop, understanding the strategic implications of R&D cooperation and the incentives behind government support has become increasingly important. This talk begins by reviewing influential contributions to the literature, particularly Hinloopen’s work (1997, 2000), which demonstrated that subsidizing R&D activities with full research-sharing is optimal in competitive markets. Building on this foundation, we extend the analysis by examining how the optimal policy changes when R&D efforts shift from being strategic substitutes to strategic complements. Our findings reveal that when R&D acts as a strategic complement, the optimal policy is to fully subsidize firms’ R&D expenditures without imposing mandatory research-sharing requirements.
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