讲座题目：Reciprocal Consideration in Joint Consumption: Dynamics and Implications
主讲嘉宾：麦克马斯特大学吴如海
时间：2025年4月29日（周二）上午9:00--11:00
地点：商学院304会议室
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数智运营与供应链管理研究团队
2025年4月25日
主讲嘉宾简介
Dr. Ruhai Wu is a tenured marketing professor at the DeGroote School of Business, McMaster University. He earned his Bachelor's and Master's degrees in Finance from Tsinghua University and a Master's and a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Texas at Austin. Dr. Wu is an established authority in the spheres of Industrial and Retail Marketing strategies. His multifaceted research encompasses a broad spectrum of disciplines, including Pricing Theory, Supply Chain/Channel Relationship Management, Advertising and Communication Strategy, and emerging E-Commerce business models. In his research, Dr. Wu employs game-theoretical and advanced empirical models to examine firms' and consumers' strategic behaviours. His research has been frequently published in top-tier journals in Marketing, Information Systems, and Operation Management, and he has received over ten competitive research grants from prestigious granting agencies, including the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada. His recent research projects include pricing and management strategies of E-commerce platforms, information asymmetry in supply chains, dynamic pricing in competitive markets, communication in joint consumption, and live streaming E-commerce.
讲座主要内容
Purchasing decisions made on behalf of others are common across a wide range of consumption contexts, from family caregiving to institutional procurement. These decisions are characterized by a distinct separation between the buyer, who incurs the cost, and the user, who experiences the consumption benefit. While prior research emphasizes information asymmetry and altruistic motives in such scenarios, little attention has been paid to how reciprocal consideration—mutual concern between buyers and users—shapes communication, purchasing outcomes, and seller strategies. We develop a game-theoretic model in which the buyer consults the user prior to purchasing, and both parties hold varying degrees of concern for each other’s welfare. Counterintuitively, we show that heightened mutual concern can distort communication: users may understate their preferences to avoid burdening the buyer, while buyers, anticipating this understatement, may over-purchase. This breakdown in signaling enables sellers to extract greater profits by sustaining higher prices and suppressing preference revelation. Further, we demonstrate that sellers can strategically manipulate communication structures—such as through advance selling or user-first marketing—to amplify or mitigate these effects. Our findings offer novel insights into how interpersonal dynamics influence delegated decision-making, and provide actionable guidance for marketers and policymakers seeking to navigate or design around the inefficiencies arising from over-accommodation in joint consumption.
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